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Abstract
Machine learning has made major advances in categoriz-
ing objects in images, yet the best algorithms miss im-
portant aspects of how people learn and think about cat-
egories. People can learn richer concepts from fewer ex-
amples, including causal models that explain how mem-
bers of a category are formed. Here, we explore the limits
of this human ability to infer causal “programs” – latent
generating processes with nontrivial algorithmic proper-
ties – from one, two, or three visual examples. People
were asked to extrapolate the programs in several ways,
for both classifying and generating new examples. As a
theory of these inductive abilities, we present a Bayesian
program learning model that searches the space of pro-
grams for the best explanation of the observations. Al-
though variable, people’s judgments are broadly consis-
tent with the model and inconsistent with several alter-
natives, including a pre-trained deep neural network for
object recognition, indicating that people can learn and
reason with rich algorithmic abstractions from sparse in-
put data.
1. Introduction
Computer vision now approaches or exceeds human per-
formance on certain large-scale object recognition tasks
(Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Russakovsky et al., 2015; Si-
monyan & Zisserman, 2014; He et al., 2015), yet the
best systems miss critical aspects of how people learn
and think about categories (Lake et al., 2017). People
learn richer and more abstract concepts than the best
machines and, remarkably, they need fewer examples in
order to do it. Children can make meaningful general-
izations after seeing just one or a handful of “pineap-
ples” or “school buses” (Smith et al., 2002; Bloom, 2000;
Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007), while the leading machine sys-
tems require far more examples. People can also use
their concepts in more sophisticated ways than machines
can – not just for classification (Fig. 1A), but also for
generation, explanation, and extrapolation (Fig. 1B). A
central challenge is understanding how people learn such
rich concepts from such limited amounts of experience.
An important limitation of contemporary AI systems
is that they lack a human-like understanding of causality
(Lake et al., 2017). People utilize causality for classifi-
A B
How will it grow?
…
Is it growing too close to 
my house?
How will it evolve if 
I trim it?
Which is another example 
of the same species?
C
Figure 1: Causal understanding influences everyday conceptual
judgments in classification (A) and extrapolation (B). The top and
left images of trees (A) have the same causal structure and were
generated from the same simple program (L-system; Prusinkiewicz
& Lindenmayer, 1990). However leading object recognition sys-
tems trained on natural images (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014; He
et al., 2015) understand little of that causal structure, perceiving
the other two images as more similar (top and right) than the nat-
ural continuation (top and left; based on euclidean/cosine distance
in the top hidden layer). (B) People also use their causal knowl-
edge to make extrapolations, including predicting how trees grow.
(C) In addition to trees, natural fractal concepts with rich causal
structure include Romanesco, sand dunes, and peacock plumage.
cation and learning (Rehder & Hastie, 2001; Murphy,
2002), explaining perceptual observations through hypo-
thetical real-world generative processes. For instance,
people group young and old trees together because they
arise through the same causal process, while state-of-
the-art computer visions systems based on convolutional
neural networks (ConvNets; LeCun et al., 1989) fail to
see this type of similarity, even after training on a mil-
lion natural images (Fig. 1A). Causality facilitates other
types of everyday reasoning, such as predicting how a
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tree will grow, or how a tree could be trimmed to keep it
healthy (Fig. 1B). These extrapolations require rich al-
gorithmic abstractions and reasoning over multi-step la-
tent processes, going beyond Bayesian networks (Pearl,
2000) and the simple causal reasoning scenarios often
studied in the lab (Gopnik et al., 2004), motivating the
need for new technical tools with these rich causal capa-
bilities.
To capture more causal and flexible types of learn-
ing, concept learning has been modeled as Bayesian pro-
gram induction (Lake et al., 2015; Goodman et al., 2015;
Stuhlmuller et al., 2010; Piantadosi et al., 2012; Ellis et
al., 2015, 2018). Programs specify causal processes for
generating examples of a category, utilizing high-level al-
gorithmic units such as loops and recursion and allowing
concepts to be used flexibly for multiple tasks. Bayesian
inference is the engine for learning causal processes from
examples, specifying the tradeoff between fitting the per-
ceptual observations and favoring simpler generative pro-
grams. In previous work, Bayesian “motor” program in-
duction has been used to learn new handwritten charac-
ters from a single example, leading to human-like pat-
terns of generalization in various generative tasks (Lake
et al., 2015, 2019). Beyond visual concept learning, pro-
gram induction has also been applied to domains such
as number word acquisition (Piantadosi et al., 2012) and
problem solving with toy trains (Khemlani et al., 2013).
This previous work covers interesting yet specialized
cases: motor programs for generating characters or rear-
ranging toy trains have unusually concrete and embodied
semantics that are not representative of all programs.
Moreover, program induction has steep computational
demands, and traditional inference algorithms struggle
to search the non-smooth and combinatorial program
spaces. If the mind can induce genuine programs to rep-
resent concepts, what are the limits of this ability? Do
people need explicit instruction regarding the underlying
causal process – as in practice writing handwritten let-
ters – or can people infer the causal process from just its
outputs? Do mental concepts naturally include powerful
computational techniques such as recursion?
Program induction over abstract recursive structures
is not just a theoretical exercise. Recursion is central
to language and thought (Hauser et al., 2002; Corballis,
2014), and many natural categories arise through recur-
sive generative processes (Fig. 1C). Visual concepts such
as trees, Romanesco broccoli, peacock plumage, ice drip-
pings, rivers, sand dunes, fingerprints, wax drippings,
clouds, etc. are natural fractals – objects with charac-
teristic patterns that appear at every scale (Mandelbrot,
1983). Breaking off a piece of Romanesco, chopping off
the branch of a tree, or zooming in on a subset of a
river delta each results in miniature versions of the orig-
inal. This signature invites learners to search for simpler
causal processes that can explain the visual complexity.
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Figure 2: A hierarchical generative model for recursive visual con-
cepts. A probabilistic context-free grammar (M) samples an L-
system (L) which defines a type of image (a concept). The L-
system L specifies an axiom, a turn angle, and re-write rules for the
“F” and “G” symbols. Tokens of a concept have both a symbolic
(Sd) and a visual “Turtle graphics” form (Id), where d indicates
the depth of recursion. In this example, the recursion operates as
follows: the axiom “F” (S0) is re-written to become “G-G+F+G-
G” (S1), which is rewritten to become S2, and so on (the “...”
indicates line breaks and are not symbols). To transform Sd into
Id, turtle starts at the bottom leftmost point of each figure with a
rightward heading.
In this paper, we studied how people and machines
learn abstract, recursive visual concepts from examples.
The tasks were designed to explore the limits of the hu-
man ability to infer structured programs from examples
– in terms of the difficulty of the concepts, the amount
of data provided (just one or a few examples), and the
range of ways people can generalize (both classification
and generation). While examining human learning, our
tasks also present a new challenge for computational cog-
nitive modeling and machine learning. We develop a
Bayesian program learning (BPL) model that learns re-
cursive program-based concepts from examples (Lake et
al., 2015), providing an ideal observer analysis of the
tasks as well as a framework for algorithmic-level mod-
eling with resource limitations. We compare with mul-
tiple alternative computational approaches that do not
operationalize concept learning as program induction, in-
cluding deep neural networks, classic pattern recognition
algorithms, and a lesioned BPL model without recursion.
2. Model
We introduce a hierarchical Bayesian model for learn-
ing visual concepts from examples. During learning, the
model receives a limited set of outputs (in this case, im-
ages) from an unknown program without the intermedi-
ate generative steps. The aim is to search the space of
possible programs for those most likely to have gener-
ated those outputs, considering both sequential and re-
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cursive programs as candidate hypotheses. To construct
the model, we first specify a language for visual concepts
that is used both for generating the experimental stimuli
and for the computational modeling. Second, we de-
scribe how to infer programs from their outputs through
the hierarchical Bayesian framework.
A language for recursive visual concepts. Linden-
mayer systems (L-systems) provide a flexible language
for recursive visual concepts, with applications to model-
ing cellular division, plant growth, and procedural graph-
ics (Lindenmayer, 1968; Prusinkiewicz & Lindenmayer,
1990; Me˘ch & Prusinkiewicz, 1996). We use a class of
L-systems that closely resemble context-free grammars,
specifying a start symbol (axiom) and a set of symbol
re-write rules. Each recursive application of the re-write
rules produces a new string of symbols. Unlike context-
free grammars that apply the re-write rules sequentially,
L-systems apply all rules in parallel. As the rules are
applied, each intermediate output is a different member
of the category, which has both a symbolic (Sd) and vi-
sual interpretation (Id), where d indicates the depth of
recursion. An example L-system is shown in Fig. 2.
Building on prior work that studies figure perception
as symbolic compression (Leeuwenberg, 1969; Buffart et
al., 1981), the symbolic description (Sd) of an example
is interpreted visually (Id) using “Turtle graphics” (Fig.
2). Turtle graphics is a common environment for teach-
ing programming, and it has been used in other program
induction models as well (Ellis et al., 2015). The envi-
ronment provides a virtual turtle that lives in 2D can-
vas with a location and orientation. The turtle can be
controlled with simple instructions such as “go straight”
(here, denoted by symbols “F” and “G”), turn left (“-”),
and turn right (“+”). As she moves, the turtle produces
ink on the canvas. In this paper, turtle always moves a
fixed number of steps, turns a fixed number of degrees,
and produces ink while moving, although more complex
control structures for the turtle are possible.
Equipped with these tools, our language builds in
intermediate-level primitives and operators (e.g. line seg-
ments, angles, recursion, etc.), as opposed to a more ba-
sic (e.g. pixels or gabor filters) or more abstract levels
of description (e.g. categories like “trees”). A success-
ful model, compared to alternatives formulated at other
levels, would support this “intermediate-level sketch” as
a cognitively natural level of description. The present
language is certainly not complete: people undoubtedly
utilize additional (or alternative) primitives and opera-
tions compared to the precise formalism introduced here
– a topic we take up in the general discussion. Neverthe-
less, our framework provides a reasonable starting point
for studying how people learn program-like abstractions
from examples, in terms of what level of description best
explains learning and what conditions are required for
generalization.
Bayesian program learning. A computational model
based on Bayesian Program Learning (BPL) model is
used to infer an unknown program given just one or a
small number of images produced by the program (Fig.
2; Lake et al., 2015) (see also, Probabilistic Language
of Thought models; Piantadosi, 2011; Goodman et al.,
2015; Overlan et al., 2016). The core of the BPL model
is the hierarchical generative process shown in Fig. 2.
First, a meta-grammar M samples a concept type, which
is a L-system based program L. To produce a token, the
depth of recursion d is either pre-specified or sampled
from a uniform distribution (from 0 to 4). The program
L is applied to its own output d times, and the symbolic
form Sd is stochastically rendered as a binary image Id.
The joint distribution of type L and tokens I0, . . . , IK is
P (L, I0, . . . , IK) = P (L)
K∏
d=0
P (Id|L). (1)
Concept learning becomes a problem for posterior infer-
ence, or reasoning about the distribution of programs
given a set of images, either P (L|I0, . . . , IK) (if the
depths are pre-specified) or P (L, j|Ij) (for a single image
of unknown depth).
We now describe each term in Eq. 1 to specify the
full model. The meta-grammar M is a probabilistic con-
text free grammar (PCFG) for generating L. At each
step, a PCFG re-write rule is chosen uniformly at random
(from the applicable set) to define the prior on L-systems,
P (L). The random variables in L are the turtle’s turning
angle and F-rule, the re-write rule for the “F” symbol.
The PCFG generates a F-rule by beginning at “Start”
and applying production rules until the string consists
of only terminal symbols, {F,G,+,−, “ ”} (Fig. 2). As
a general class of grammars, L-systems can produce vi-
sual forms that are causally opaque, either because the
form changes qualitatively at each iteration or because
Turtle draws on-top of existing lines. Instead of work-
ing with this unrestricted class, we focus on L-systems
that more closely resemble natural growth processes like
those in Fig. 1, and for which people have a reasonable
possibility of inferring the underlying growth process. At
each iteration, these programs sprout symmetric growths
from a subset of their straight line segments (“F” sym-
bols sprout and “G” symbols do not) that maintain the
same global shape at each iteration (Fig. 2), with Turtle
avoiding crossing previous paths. The details for gen-
erating L from M are provided in the Supplementary
material.
Last, BPL requires an ink model to interface between
the L-systems and the raw images they are meant to
explain. To complete the forward model, an image Id
is sampled from a stochastic process P (Id|L) that cre-
ates an image by computing the Turtle trajectory and
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sprinkling ink along the route. First, L is unrolled for d
iterations to produce a string of turtle symbols (Fig 2).
Second, Turtle traces her trajectory, which is centered in
the image frame and rescaled to have a common width.
Third, a stochastic ink model transforms the real-valued
trajectory into grayscale ink on pixels with discrete coor-
dinates, using the approach developed in Hinton & Nair
(2006) with the specific parameters used in Lake et al.
(2015). Each real-valued pixel defines the probability of
producing a black pixel (rather than white) under an
independent Bernoulli model.1
To summarize, the BPL model specifies a grammar
(PCFG) for generating another grammar-like program
(L-system), and a process for expanding and rendering L-
systems as raw images (via turtle graphics). The model
can also solve the inverse problem: given an image, it
can search for the underlying program (L-system) that
is most likely to have generated it. Any given image is
consistent with both recursive and non-recursive inter-
pretations, and thus the model decides for itself which in-
terpretation to take. An interpretation unrolled to d ≥ 2
iterations is a recursive generative process, while an in-
terpretation with d = 1 is a static, non-recursive genera-
tive process. Recovered programs can be run forward to
generate further recursive iterations, generalizing beyond
the input to perform a range of tasks.
To approximate Bayesian inference, we can draw pos-
terior samples from P (L|I0, . . . , IK) (pre-specified depth)
or P (L, j|Ij) (unknown depth) using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) and a general inference scheme for
grammatically structured hypothesis spaces. In short, a
candidate L-system has a parse tree for generating it
from the meta-grammar, and a proposal is made by re-
generating a sub-tree from the meta-grammar to produce
a new L-system (Goodman, Tenenbaum, et al., 2008; Pi-
antadosi et al., 2012). The algorithm was implemented
in the LOTlib software package (Piantadosi, 2014). This
algorithm is effective for our problem, except that small
changes to hypotheses can sometimes produce very long
symbolic forms (Sd) that require substantial computa-
tion to render as images. It is straightforward to rule out
overly complex proposals without fully simulating their
consequences, and thus the length of the sequences (Sd)
was capped just above the length of the longest concept
in the experiments. Hypotheses that exceeded this limit
were decremented in recursive depth to Sd−1.
As an account of learning, it is important to state
which components of BPL we see as critical and which
are not. Our experiments examine whether people
can learn recursive visual concepts from examples, and
whether they engage with the underlying causal struc-
1Images presented to participants were rendered with standard
Python graphics rather than the BPL ink model. The BPL ink
model parameters were fit (via maximum likelihood) to the graph-
ics using random turtle scribbles.
ture and its non-trivial algorithmic properties. Com-
paring models allows us to compare alternative levels of
description, but it does not serve to identify the precise
language and representational primitives that people use.
In fact, in these experiments our instantiation of BPL
has several advantages over people, reflecting its status
as an ideal observer. The model starts with exactly the
right internal programming language, allowing it to learn
concepts in this family but not others. People do not
have this internal language directly; instead, if they suc-
ceed on the tasks, their “language of thought” (Fodor,
1975; Piantadosi, 2011; Goodman et al., 2015; Goodman,
Mansinghka, et al., 2008) must be powerful enough to en-
gage with the algorithmic properties of these stimuli, yet
general enough to learn many other types of programs
too. In sum, BPL provides an account of learning as
inducing recursive generative programs, but we would
not necessarily expect it to outperform alternative mod-
els that can also induce recursive generative programs,
albeit with differing sets of primitives. The current ex-
periments aim to distinguish models that engage with
the algorithmic content of the stimuli from those that
do not, such as the methods introduced below for com-
puting visual similarity and for non-recursive program
induction.
Alternative models. We compare BPL with alterna-
tives that do not utilize explicit program-like structures
or abstractions, including three different approaches to
measuring visual similarity based on generic features.
The first uses the pre-trained visual features of a deep
convolutional neural network (ConvNet; Krizhevsky et
al., 2012), which is informed by extensive knowledge of
objects and natural scenes instead of symbolic programs.
The ConvNet is pre-trained on the large scale ImageNet
object recognition challenge with 1.2 million natural im-
ages (Russakovsky et al., 2015), and similarity is mea-
sured as cosine distance in the top-most feature vector
before the output layer. We also compare with Euclidean
distance in pixel space and a classic metric in computer
vision, the modified Hausdorff distance for comparing
binary images (Dubuisson & Jain, 1994). These three
metrics are not an exhaustive list of possibilities, but
they represent standard techniques for measuring visual
similarity that do not rely upon the type of explicit gen-
erative structure and algorithmic abstractions that BPL
uses to generalize.
We also compare with a lesioned “non-recursive BPL”
model restricted to depth d ≤ 1, such that recursion can-
not be used to explain the visual examples. The algo-
rithm seeks to explain the (most mature) example with
a complex sequence of Turtle commands, such that the
most complex example in the experiment contains 470
symbols. To reduce the considerable search burden of
finding these sequences, the model is provided with the
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ground truth generative sequence Sj for the most ma-
ture example. Given the contour is modeled as a flat
sequence, the likelihood of any new image Ij+1 is simply
modeled as P (Ij+1|Sj) without recursive expansion.
3. Experiments
Two experiments explored the human limits of infer-
ring program-based concepts from examples. Partici-
pants were asked to learn new visual concepts from just
one or a few examples of their outputs, and their abil-
ity to generalize was evaluated either through classifying
new examples (experiment 1) or generating new exam-
ples (experiment 2). People, BPL, and the alternative
models were compared on a set of tasks of varying dif-
ficulty, providing a comprehensive picture of the human
ability and its boundaries. All of the experiments are
available online,2 and the details are provided below.
Experiment 1: Classification. This experiment ex-
amines how people classify new examples of a recursive
visual concept.
Methods.Thirty participants in the United States were
recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk using psiTurk
(Gureckis et al., 2015). Participants were paid $2.50, and
there was no special incentive for high accuracy. The ex-
periment took an average of 11:53 minutes with a range
from 3:52 to 36:51 minutes.
Participants were shown examples from 24 different
recursive visual concepts and asked to classify new ex-
amples (Fig. 3).3 Each of 24 trials introduce a separate
concept, and participants made one classification judg-
ment per trial. No feedback was provided to participants,
in order to prevent supervised learning in the task. The
instructions specified that each trial introduced “a new
type of alien crystal” that had infected a surface and had
been growing for some time. Participants were asked to
predict what the crystal will look like as it continues
to grow, and they were presented with a choice of six
images. The stimuli were quite visually complex, and
participants could magnify the details by rolling their
mouse over a particular image area. After reading the
instructions, participants were quizzed on their content
and cycled back to re-read, until they got all of the com-
prehension questions correct (Crump et al., 2013).
Participants were assigned to one of two conditions
that differ in the number of training examples: the
“incremental” condition observed each step of growth
(d = {0, 1, 2}; Fig. 3B), and the “block” condition ob-
served only the final step of growth (d = {0, 2}; Fig.
3A). These two conditions explore the boundary of the
2https://cims.nyu.edu/~brenden/supplemental/lrvc/
vp-exp.html
3One trial was removed after collecting the data because two
visually identical distractors were mistakenly included.
Before infection After infection
! What do you think the crystal will look like if you let it grow longer? 
Before infection Step 1 Step 2
! What do you think the crystal will look like if you let it 
grow one step longer? 
A
B
Figure 3: Classifying a new example of a recursive visual concepts.
Examples trials are shown for the block (A) vs. incremental con-
dition (B). Answers: bottom-left (A) and top-middle (B).
human ability in different ways, but we did not have
strong a priori predictions regarding how this manipula-
tion would influence behavior – the ideal observer nature
of the BPL model allows it to succeed in either condi-
tion. The incremental condition is an example of the Vi-
sual Recursive Task, and previous work has shown that
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Figure 4: Mean human performance on classification (A) and gen-
eration (B) tasks with recursive visual concepts. Accuracy for clas-
sification is based on a six-way choice. Accuracy for generation is
measured on the basis of individual decisions (left) and whether
exactly the right exemplar was produced (right). Error bars are ±
SEM.
both children and adults can perform the task success-
fully (Martins et al., 2015, 2014). Our aim differs in that
the incremental classification experiment is just the sim-
plest of the evaluations we study. The more challenging
“block” condition requires generalization from just a sin-
gle static example of the concept (one-shot learning), and
the generation task (experiment 2) probes richer forms
of generalization beyond classification.
The 24 visual concepts were created by sampling L-
systems from the BPL prior distribution. The provided
examples were unrolled to depth d = 2, and the task was
to choose the natural extension (formally, the next itera-
tion in depth d = 3). The distractors in the forced-choice
judgments were created by taking the example stimulus
at d = 2 (the “After infection” image in Fig. 3A or the
“Step 2” image in Fig. 3B) and applying the expansion
rules from a different L-system. The 24 concepts were
sampled from the prior with a few additional constraints
that standardized the concepts and eased cognitive pen-
etrability: the fractal grows upwards, the turtle does not
cross over her own path, and the F-rule expansion does
not allow for two adjacent straight line symbols. Distrac-
tors were sampled without these constraints to ensure a
sufficient variety of continuation types.
To perform the classification, BPL uses the last sample
produced using MCMC to approximate the posterior pre-
dictive distribution, which is either P (I3|I0, I1, I2) (incre-
classification generation
human behavior 63.5% 59.9%
BPL 100% 100%
-limited MCMC* 64.5% 58.2%
-without recursion 30.4% 0%
ConvNet 4.4% 0%
Euclidean 30.4% 0%
Hausdorff 17.4% 0%
Random 16.7% 0%
Table 1: Accuracy for humans and machines on the classification
and generation tasks. Human performance is based on the incre-
mental condition. Responses in the generation task were counted
as correct only if participants produced exactly the right exem-
plar. (*) BPL with limited MCMC can achieve a range of different
performance levels and was fit to match human performance.
mental condition with known depth) or P (Ij+1|Ij) (block
condition with a single exemplar at unknown depth j).
Each possible answer choice is scored according to this
distribution, and the image option with highest posterior
predictive probability is selected.
Results.Overall, participants extrapolated in ways con-
sistent with the underlying program (Fig. 4A). The aver-
age accuracy across participants was 64.9% (SD = 22.1),
which is significantly better than chance performance of
16.7% (t(29) = 11.8, p < .001). Performance was similar
in both conditions, with 63.5% correct in the incremental
condition (SD = 25.0, n = 15) and 66.4% in the block
condition (SD = 18.5, n = 15; t(28) = 0.35, p > 0.5).
Average item accuracy was also correlated across the
two conditions (r = 0.76, p < 0.001). Neither the pre-
trained deep ConvNet nor Modified Hausdorff distance
could classify the images better than chance (accuracy
was 4.4% and 17.4%, respectively, choosing the test im-
age that most closely matched the last training image).
Evidently, people could intelligently reason about gen-
erative processes whether or not incremental steps were
provided.
There was substantial variability in participant perfor-
mance. Overall accuracy was correlated with time spent
on the experiment (r = 0.61, p < .001). In a post-
experiment survey, participants who reported recogniz-
ing the stimuli as fractals performed better (M = 76.1%)
than those who did not (M = 57.5%; t(28) = 2.4,
p < 0.05). Importantly, even participants who did not
recognize the stimuli as fractals performed above chance
(t(17) = 7.84, p < .001). Additionally, the degree of fa-
miliarity with fractals and whether or not a participant
was a computer programmer did not significantly pre-
dict accuracy, which is noteworthy since recursion is an
important technique in computer programming.
Performance of the computational models is summa-
rized in Table 1. Classification with BPL was simulated
using MCMC for posterior inference. With enough sam-
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ples, the model is a perfect classifier. To achieve high
performance, the model depends crucially on its ability
to learn recursive programs. In the block condition, the
posterior mode program (aggregated across chains) was
always recursive and correctly predicted the ground truth
recursive depth, across all of the trials. In contrast, the
non-recursive BPL model failed to classify new examples
correctly, achieving only 30.4% accuracy, performing at
the level of the simple Euclidean distance metric.
As an ideal learner, BPL reaches perfect performance
with enough samples, but people are not perfect clas-
sifiers. One way to analyze behavioral deviations is
through failures of search (or limited sampling; Lieder et
al., 2012; Vul et al., 2014; Bramley et al., 2017), with indi-
vidual participants simulated as separate MCMC chains
where some may fail to discover a suitable explanation
of the data. With 15 simulated participants in each con-
dition, 240 Metropolis-Hastings proposals for each chain
provides the best match for human-level accuracy, if de-
cisions are made based on the last sample (64.5% correct
on average). This establishes only that BPL can achieve
human-level accuracy or higher, while the four alterna-
tive models struggle to perform the classification task all
together (Table 1). However the limited MCMC model
can be compared to behavior in other ways. Indeed, with
this algorithmic limitation, BPL’s predictions for which
concepts are easier or harder to learn were moderately
associated with human performance, in that the mean
accuracy for the model and participants was correlated
(r = 0.58, p < 0.01, Supplementary material Fig. S1A).
Unlike the alternatives, BPL can correctly classify the
stimuli and predict which decisions are easier or harder
for people.
Note, however, that it is possible that people used a
heuristic to make classification decisions and that these
heuristics only approximated BPL. In particular, choos-
ing the image that contains a smaller (possibly rotated)
version of the example image is closely related, but also
distinct from, learning a recursive visual program. Al-
though this heuristic does solve the classification task, it
does not help to explain, as with BPL, why some con-
cepts are easier to learn than others. Moreover, this
heuristic does not specify how to generate new exam-
ples of the concept, which is the task that was evaluated
next.
Experiment 2: Generation. This experiment exam-
ines how people generate new examples of a recursive
visual concept. Compared to classification experiment,
this is a more difficult and unconstrained form of gen-
eralization that further explores the boundaries of the
human ability.
Methods.Thirty participants in the United States were
recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk using psiTurk. As
before, participants were paid $2.50 and there was no
special incentive for high accuracy. The experiment took
an average of 15:02 minutes with a range of 6:35 to 30:17
minutes.
The procedures were adapted from experiment 1 and
were the same except where noted. As before, partici-
pants were randomly assigned to either the incremental
or block condition. There were 13 trials each with novel
concepts, and example trials are shown in Fig. 5. In
the incremental condition, participants saw novel con-
cepts with three steps of growth (unrolled to depths
d = {0, 1, 2, 3}), and they were asked to predict just
one additional step (d = 4) beyond the most mature
exemplar that was viewed. In the block condition, par-
ticipants saw just the last, most mature step of growth
(d = {0, 3}) and were asked to demonstrate what the
crystal will look like as it continues to grow (d = 4).
Participants used a custom web interface to generate
the new example (Fig. 5ii). Clicking on a line segment
toggles it from a deactivated state to an activated state
(turning a “G” into an “F” in the symbolic language), or
vice versa. Moving the mouse over a line segment high-
lights it in another color, and the color reveals how a click
would affect the state. When highlighted green, clicking
the segment sprouts a growth, activating it. When high-
lighted red, the segment is already activated and clicking
it causes it to deactivate. Shortcut buttons allow partici-
pants to activate or deactivate all of the segments with a
single click. Participants could interact with the display
for as long as they needed.
Participants were informed that the order of their ac-
tions was not important, and only the final product mat-
tered. For some of the concepts in the previous exper-
iment, the segments were too small for participants to
effectively see and click; thus, this experiment used the
13 concepts from the classification experiment with the
largest line segments. For 3 of the 13 concepts, some of
the segments are redundant in that they create the same
visual growth when activated as other segments (see the
example in Fig. 5A-ii). For this reason, accuracy was
scored according to the resulting visual form rather than
the individual clicks, since different click patterns could
result in the same visual pattern.
Four participants were excluded from the analysis.
Two participants activated all of the growths for every
single trial, and one participant did so for all but one
trial. The data failed to record for one participant.
To generate a new example, BPL uses the last sam-
ple from MCMC to approximate the posterior predictive
distribution, which is either P (I4|I0, . . . , I3) (incremen-
tal condition with known depth) or P (Ij+1|Ij) (block
condition with a single exemplar at unknown depth j).
BPL makes a response using the same interactive display
that participants used, allowing for 2m possible responses
given a display with m expandable segment. To make a
choice, the model visits each segment once in random or-
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Figure 5: Generating new examples of recursive visual concepts.
Responses for individual participants are shown for two trials (A
and B) with different concepts (i). The incremental condition ob-
served all three steps, while the block condition observed just step
0 and step 3. An interactive display allowed participants to grow
the figure by clicking on line segments of the example at step 3 (ii).
Generated examples are shown in (iii) and (iv), and the number
below each figure is the number of participants who generated it.
The most frequently generated stimulus was correct in all cases
except A-iv (not all responses shown for this group).
der, and greedily decides whether or not to expand it in
order to maximize the posterior predictive probability.
Results.Participants generated exemplars that were
highly structured and generally consistent with the un-
derlying program, although there was substantial vari-
ability across participants (Fig. 5iii-iv). Since each trial
consists of many individual judgments (stimuli ranged
between 22 and 125 segments), the accuracy of a trial
was first computed by averaging across individual seg-
ment decisions, and then the accuracy of a participant
was computed by averaging across trials. Since growths
tend to be sparse in the ground truth concepts, a base-
line that deactivates all segments achieves 57.7% cor-
rect. Both groups performed significantly better than
baseline (Fig. 4B): the incremental condition achieved
89.2% correct (SD = 6.5, t(13) = 17.4, p < 0.001) and
the block condition achieved 70.0% correct (SD = 14.2,
t(11) = 2.86, p < 0.05). The difference in means between
groups was also significant (t(24) = 4.36, p < 0.001).
Remarkably, participants were able to generate pre-
cisely the right example on a substantial number of tri-
als, such that the example was only marked as correct
if every individual segment was correct (Fig. 4B). A
random responder is effectively guaranteed to perform
at 0% correct, since even the simplest trial has over 4
million possible responses. Alternatively, 3 of the 13 ex-
emplars could be produced correctly by activating all of
the segments in the interface (23.1% correct). Partic-
ipants in the incremental condition produced precisely
the right exemplar in 59.9% of cases (SD = 18.9), while
participants in the block condition did so in 24.4% of
cases (SD = 21.9; difference in means was significant,
t(24) = 4.26, p < 0.001). Although both groups were
far better than the random baseline, only the incremen-
tal group was significantly better than 23.1% baseline
on this conservative measure of accuracy (t(13) = 7.03,
p < .001). Thus, participants were accurate in both
individual decisions and in aggregate, producing up to
125 decisions correctly to generate the right example. In
the most difficult condition, participants produced ex-
actly the right example only a quarter of the time, even
if their accuracy was 70% on individual decisions, sug-
gesting people’s inductive capabilities were nearing their
limits.
BPL can also use the interactive interface to generate
new examples. If the MCMC simulation is run for long
enough, BPL achieves perfect performance, demonstrat-
ing that BPL can successfully produce new examples of
recursive visual concepts. As with classification, we used
short MCMC chains to simulate individual participants
and modeled a response based on the last sample. The
number of MCMC steps was fit to match human accu-
racy for generating exactly the right example, finding
160 steps matches the incremental group and 80 steps
matches the block group. Unlike the classification task,
MCMC alone did not predict which items are easier for
participants, and model and participant accuracies were
not significantly correlated (r = 0.11 and r = −0.16
for incremental and block groups, respectively; Supple-
mentary material Fig. S2). Instead, properties of the
response interface were the driving factors in item diffi-
culty. Examples that can be generated with one or two
well-placed actions were easier, while examples that re-
quired many actions were more difficult. For instance,
the concept in Fig. 5B can be correctly extrapolated by
activating all the segments with the appropriate short-
cut button, while the concept in Fig. 5A requires eight
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individual activation actions. Assuming participants can
begin from a fully activated or deactivated display, item
accuracy is predicted by the number of required actions
to produce the correct exemplar, with a correlation of
r = −0.66 (p < 0.05) for the incremental condition and
r = −0.61 (p < 0.05) for the block condition (Supple-
mentary material Fig. S1B). This effect can be repro-
duced by the BPL model with response noise when act-
ing using the response interface, but in our simulations
this did not account for additional variance beyond the
number of optimal actions.
Performance of the different computational models is
compared in Table 1. Of the range of models compared,
BPL is the only computational model that learns recur-
sive programs, and likewise it is the only model that
successfully generates new examples of a novel concept.
In contrast, the ConvNet, modified Hausdorff distance,
Euclidean distance, and non-recursive BPL utterly fail
at this task. For these algorithms, the best response is
always to (incorrectly) create a new exemplar with zero
growths activated, since it is maximally similar to the
previous exemplar. Instead, recursive program-like rep-
resentations provide an account of how a range of gener-
alizations are possible from only the briefest exposure to
a new concept.
4. Discussion
Compared to the best object recognition systems, people
learn richer concepts from fewer examples. Recent re-
search in cognitive science, machine learning, and com-
puter vision has begun to model learning as a form of
program induction (Zhu & Mumford, 2006; Savova &
Tenenbaum, 2008; Savova et al., 2009; Stuhlmuller et al.,
2010; Piantadosi, 2011; Piantadosi et al., 2012; Khemlani
et al., 2013; Goodman et al., 2015; Lake et al., 2015; El-
lis et al., 2015; Yildirim & Jacobs, 2015; Rothe et al.,
2017; Amalric et al., 2017; Ellis et al., 2018; Depeweg et
al., 2018), yet there are steep computational obstacles to
building a general purpose program learner. It is unclear
how the mind could learn genuine programs in a general
way.
Here, we explored the boundaries of the human ability
to learn programs from examples. We probed several key
dimensions in a concept learning task: the difficulty of
the concepts, the number of examples, and the format
of generalization. We found that people could both clas-
sify and generate new examples in ways consistent with
a Bayesian program learning model, even though the
model was provided with substantial knowledge about
the structure of the concept space. In a classification
task that fools the best object recognition algorithms,
participants responded with high accuracy and in accor-
dance with the underlying recursive structure, regardless
of whether they saw just one or two examples (block ver-
sus incremental condition). In a more challenging gener-
ation task, people constructed new examples that were
consistent with the underlying programs. For generation,
additional examples provided a boost in accuracy (three
examples versus one example), while the one-shot case
proved taxing and approached the boundary of people’s
inductive abilities.
People’s success contrasts with the performance of pre-
trained object recognition systems (ConvNets) and other
pattern recognition techniques that do not explicitly
represent causal processes and algorithmic abstractions
like recursion. Although feature-based approaches have
proven effective in machine learning and computer vision,
causal modeling and program induction hold promise
for additional advances. Causal representations are cen-
tral to human perceptual and conceptual abilities (Mur-
phy & Medin, 1985; Gelman, 2003; Leyton, 2003; Re-
hder & Hastie, 2001; Bever & Poeppel, 2010), and they
can also form the basis for high performance classifica-
tion and prediction algorithms (Lake et al., 2015; Pearl,
2019). Causal models can help explain wide variations
in appearance without the need for extensive training
data– for instance, highlighting the commonalities be-
tween young and old trees of the same species, despite
dramatic differences in their superficial features (Fig 1A).
Causal knowledge can also inform other types of every-
day conceptual judgments (Fig 1B): Is this tree growing
too close to my house? What will it look like next sum-
mer as it continues to grow?
There are several straightforward and meaningful ex-
tensions of the representation language studied here. Al-
though the current concepts have some stochastic prop-
erties, including the depth of recursion and the stochastic
renderer, they are more deterministic than their natu-
ral analogs (Fig. 1C). Our concepts grow in an orderly
sequence of recursive steps, while natural growth is far
more stochastic and only imperfectly scale-invariant. In
future work, we intend to explore stochastic L-systems
to address some of these challenges (Prusinkiewicz &
Lindenmayer, 1990). Both failures to grow and spon-
taneous growths could be modeled with noise that flips
“F” symbols (growth) to become “G” symbols (non-
growth) and vice versa with a small probability, be-
fore applying the re-write rules at each recursive step.
Additionally, context-sensitive L-systems could be used
as a more powerful language for generative processes
(Prusinkiewicz & Lindenmayer, 1990), necessary for rep-
resenting environmentally-sensitive growth processes like
a tree that grows around an obstacle. Finally, people
likely have primitives for simple shapes like triangles,
squares, and rectangles, while the current BPL imple-
mentation can produce these shapes but does not rep-
resent them differently than other contours. Providing
models with a richer set of primitives could further help
close the gap between human and machine performance.
All of these extensions are compatible with our frame-
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work, and are necessary components of an account of
concept learning as program induction.
Our tasks pose a new challenge problem for machine
learning. Although one could explore different pre-
training regimens for deep ConvNets, which could im-
prove their performance on our tasks, an alternative is
to explore learning generative, program-like representa-
tions with neural networks. There has been significant
recent interest in “differentiable programming,” or us-
ing neural networks to learn simple types of programs
from examples, including sorting (Graves et al., 2014),
arithmetic (Weston et al., 2015), finding shortest paths
in a graph (Graves et al., 2016), and learning composi-
tional rules (Lake, 2019). Developing alternative models
through differentiable programming could further refine
the account presented here, establishing which aspects of
the representational language are essential and which are
not. Domain general program induction remains an im-
portant computational and scientific goal, with potential
to deepen our understanding of how people learn such
rich concepts, from such little data, across such a wide
range of domains.
Overall, our results suggest that the best program
learning techniques will likely need to include explicit –
or easily formulated – high-level computational abstrac-
tions. As demonstrated here, people can learn visual con-
cepts with rich notions of recursion, growth, and graphi-
cal rendering from just one or a few examples. Computa-
tional approaches must similarly engage rich algorithmic
content to achieve human-level concept learning.
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Supplementary material:
People infer recursive visual concepts from just a few examples
Generating L-systems from the meta-grammar
The L-system axiom is always “F”. The angle is sampled uniformly from {60, 90, 120}. The constrained
F-rule is generated as follows. The start symbol produces three non-terminals: “X” (prefix), “Y”
(body), and “Z” (middle). After each non-terminal grounds out as a string of terminals, the right-
hand-side of the F-rule is defined by the resulting string concatenation X||Y ||Z||reverse(Y )||X, where
|| concatenates and reverse(·) reorders string. For instance, if X = G, Y = −G+, and Z = F , the rule
F ← G-G+F+G-G is produced. The G-rule is defined deterministically given the F-rule, so that all
line segments (“F” and “G”) grow at the same rate at each iteration.
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A Bclassification generation
Figure S1: Item analysis for classification (A) and generation (B) tasks. Each point represents a
different recursive visual concept. Classification accuracy is measured as performance in the six-
way classification task, and generation accuracy is measured by marking exemplars as correct only if
every individual segment is correct. The behavioral data is aggregated across incremental and block
conditions. Item difficulty is best predicted by BPL with limited MCMC for classification (A) and the
number of required actions to produce the correct exemplar for generation (B).
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Figure S2: Item analysis for generation task. Each point represents one of the 13 different recursive
visual concepts, both for the incremental group (A) and the block group (B). Accuracy is measured by
marking exemplars as correct only if every individual segment is correct. Individual concepts (C) are
shown expanded to depth 3, while the task was to generate a new example at depth 4. The concepts
highlighted in red and purple have similar complexity for BPL with limited MCMC (same re-write
rule but with different placements of ‘F’ and ‘G’ symbols), while the red one is far more difficult
for participants to interpret. Likewise for the concepts highlighted in green and blue. However, the
number of actions required to produce the correct exemplar (listed below each concept) does predict
the difficulty of the item for participants, where exemplars that require fewer clicks are easier (see also
Fig. S1B).
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